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Strong international health agreements and good plan-
ning created a structure and common procedure for nations 
involved in detection and evaluation of the emergence of in-
fluenza A (H1N1). This report describes a timeline of events 
that led to the determination of the epidemic as a public 
health  emergency  of  international  concern,  following  the 
agreed-upon procedures of the International Health Regu-
lations. These events illustrate the need for sound interna-
tional health agreements and should be a call to action for 
all nations to implement these agreements to the best of 
their abilities.
I
n March 2009, human cases of infection with a novel 
strain of influenza A virus (H1N1) emerged in Mexico, 
the United States, and Canada. As of May 26, this con-
tagious virus has spread to 46 countries, accounting for 
≈13,000 cases. To date, >90 deaths caused by this virus 
have occurred, most of which have been in Mexico (1). 
Suspected cases are even more widespread, and the num-
ber of cases will inevitably continue to increase and the 
virus will spread to more countries in the coming weeks 
and months.
Predicting the course of the epidemic is difficult, but 
one can state with certainty that good multilateral plans and 
agreements facilitated the initial notification of the disease. 
Good planning has also enabled communication and action 
around the emerging epidemic in a manner that has been 
rational, predictable, and productive. These plans, which 
only came into being in the past 5 years, enabled an un-
precedented level of timely cooperation and communica-
tion for assessing and responding to the novel influenza A 
virus (H1N1).
Some have argued that the initial detection of the out-
breaks was delayed (2), and others have opined that the 
international disease surveillance and reporting system is 
severely crippled by a lack of resources (3). Although these 
debates will no doubt continue, it is crucial to document 
how, starting with initial notification by Mexico, the sys-
tems for communication and disease mitigation worked es-
sentially as they were designed.
Planning
The International Health Regulations (2005)
A major international agreement, a regional agreement, 
and a multitude of pandemic plans put into place since 2005 
have set the stage for the events of the past few weeks. In 
response to the threat of emerging infectious diseases, and 
pushed into action by the events related to the emergence 
of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the World 
Health  Assembly  agreed  to  accept  the  revised  Interna-
tional Health Regulations in May 2005. These regulations, 
known as IHR (2005), are binding to all member states of 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and include several 
major provisions aimed at facilitating global communica-
tion and cooperation for early detection and containment 
of events termed public health emergencies of international 
concern (PHEIC). Although many international efforts in 
health have been disease specific, IHR (2005) focuses on 
the larger issues of ensuring competent surveillance and 
detection systems in every part of the world and a global 
commitment to work together to mitigate the consequences 
of a public health emergency.
Included in the regulations are provisions that mem-
ber states are required to 1) establish a National IHR Focal 
Point for communication with WHO, 2) meet core capacity 
requirements for disease surveillance, 3) inform WHO in a 
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timely fashion of any incident that might be considered a 
PHEIC, and 4) respond to additional requests for informa-
tion by WHO (4). The revised regulations broadened the 
type of events that needed to be evaluated and reported to 
WHO to include a list of always notifiable diseases and an 
algorithm for determining a potential public health emer-
gency, regardless of source or origin (5). In addition, the 
regulations clearly articulate that the purpose is to “pre-
vent, protect against, control and provide a public health 
response to the international spread of disease” in a manner 
that  “avoids  unnecessary  interference  with  international 
traffic and trade” (6).
The  IHR  (2005)  were  implemented  in  the  summer 
of 2007. Two nations submitted reservations; the United 
States cited federalism concerns, and India clarified how 
it would regard regions infected with yellow fever (7). By 
the terms of the regulations, all member states should cur-
rently have in place a National IHR Focal Point for com-
munication, should complete assessments of their disease 
surveillance capacity by the summer of 2009, and should 
develop and maintain their core surveillance and response 
capacities by the summer of 2012.
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America
In March 2005, the United States, Canada, and Mex-
ico launched a trilateral agreement called the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). The pur-
pose of this agreement was to enhance regional cooperation 
and information sharing around business competitiveness, 
energy, emergency management, securing of borders, and 
health (8). The health focus within SPP was to enhance 
public health cross-border coordination in infectious dis-
ease  surveillance,  prevention,  and  control.  In  particular, 
leaders of the 3 nations agreed to a set of principles that 
would guide collaboration in the detection and response 
to avian and pandemic influenza. These principles led to 
the  formulation  of  the  North  American  Plan  for  Avian 
and Pandemic Influenza (NAPAPI). This plan stresses the 
need for communication between nations and coordination 
in responding to the threat of a novel strain of influenza; 
it also lays out a set of actions for each nation relative to 
emergency coordination and communications, avian influ-
enza, pandemic influenza, border monitoring and control 
measures, and critical infrastructure protection (9). A se-
nior level coordinating body was established to facilitate 
planning and preparedness as well as to serve as a contact 
in the event of a human outbreak caused by a novel strain 
of influenza (10).
Pandemic Plans
Spurred by fears of avian influenza (H5N1), the United 
States embarked on an aggressive policy to put into place a 
series of plans at the federal, state, and local levels. These 
pandemic plans address continuity of operations, social dis-
tancing strategies, vaccine and antiviral production and dis-
tribution, hospital surge capacity, and special considerations 
for vulnerable populations. In addition to plans, there were 
accompanying implementation schedules for implementing 
necessary infrastructure in place to ensure the plans would 
be useful should a pandemic emerge (11,12).
WHO  has  had  a  pandemic  planning  and  guidance 
document available since 1999. In 2005, WHO revised the 
document in response to the threat of avian influenza. This 
document was revised and rereleased in April 2009, in part 
to reflect advances in global pandemic planning, the IHR 
(2005) entry into force, and scientific advances in the de-
velopment and stockpiling of countermeasures (13).
Events and IHR (2005)
I have outlined a series of events, beginning with the 
reporting by Mexico of an outbreak of acute respiratory 
illness. This event and subsequent events were linked with 
the corresponding article or provision in the IHR (2005), 
the SPP NAPAPI, or the WHO Pandemic Influenza Pre-
paredness and Response guidance document. The events 
were organized according to the major goals of the IHR 
(2005):  improving  notification  procedures,  identifying 
public health emergencies of international concern, facili-
tating ongoing global communication during an emergen-
cy, and mitigating the consequences of the event through 
a coordinated response. In addition, the determination of 
pandemic phases as part of the IHR (2005) procedures, 
yet specific to this particular type of public health emer-
gency, is discussed.
Notification
On March 18, 2009, surveillance systems in Mexico 
alerted authorities to an unusual number of cases of influen-
za-like illness (2,14). After a few days of discussion start-
ing on April 11 between the Pan American Health Organi-
zation (PAHO) and Mexican authorities regarding unusual 
numbers of acute respiratory infections, the authorities no-
tified PAHO according to recommendations in IHR Focal 
Points of a potential PHEIC. The event was an outbreak of 
acute respiratory illness in the states of Veracruz and Oax-
aca, Mexico (15,16).
On April 18, the United States, through the National 
IHR Focal Point, notified PAHO of 2 cases of human influ-
enza A (H1N1) in children in San Diego County and Im-
perial County, California. The United States assessed that 
these cases could be a potential PHEIC (17).
The initial notification by Mexico and the United States 
of a potential PHEIC within their borders aligns with the 
following articles of the IHR (2005):
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•   IHR (2005) Article 4 (Responsible Authorities). Each 
state is responsible for designating a National IHR 
Focal Point for 24 × 7 × 365 communication with 
WHO, including for dissemination of information 
from WHO to relevant sectors of the state. These 
National IHR Focal Points were used to officially 
communicate the potential PHEICs to the regional 
WHO office (PAHO).
•   IHR  (2005)  Annex  2  (Decision  Instrument).  The 
decision  instrument  in  Annex  2  helps  nations 
determine which events should be reported to the 
WHO as potential PHEICs. Mexico and the United 
States  presumably  used  this  decision  instrument 
to  determine  if  the  events  constituted  a  potential 
PHEIC.
•   IHR  (2005)  Article  6  (Notification).  State  Parties 
shall  notify  WHO  (through  their  WHO  Regional 
Office–PAHO in this case) by way of the National 
IHR Focal Point of all events that may constitute a 
PHEIC. This notification must occur within 24 hours 
of assessment of the public health information by 
the national authority. After a notification, the State 
Party and WHO shall continue to communicate in a 
timely fashion about the notified event.
Determination of a PHEIC
On  April  25,  the  Director-General  of  WHO,  after 
convening a meeting of the Emergency Committee, de-
termined that the outbreak of novel influenza A (H1N1) 
constituted a PHEIC and made a public announcement. 
This was the first declaration of a PHEIC after the entry 
into force of the IHR (2005) (18,19). The IHR Emergency 
Committee, which was convened by the Director-General 
on April 25, and which provides advice regarding the de-
termination of the PHEIC, proposed that nations increase 
their active surveillance for unusual outbreaks of influenza- 
like illness (20).
The formation of the Emergency Committee and the 
process of declaring a PHEIC proceeded according to the 
following provisions of the IHR (2005):
•   IHR (2005) Article 12 (Determination of a PHEIC). 
The  Director-General  determines  on  the  basis 
of  information  received  from  the  affected  states 
whether  an  event  constitutes  a  PHEIC.  If  the 
Director-General assesses the event to be a PHEIC, 
she then consults the affected states regarding her 
determination. Subsequently, the Director-General 
seeks the views of an Emergency Committee.
•   IHR  (2005)  Article  48  (Emergency  Committee: 
Terms  of  Reference  and  Composition)  and 
Article  49  (Emergency  Committee:  Procedures). 
The  Director-General  establishes  an  Emergency 
Committee to provide views on whether an event 
constitutes a PHEIC; the termination of a PHEIC; 
and  proposes  issuance,  modification,  extension, 
or termination of temporary recommendations for 
mitigating  the  consequences  of  the  PHEIC.  The 
Emergency Committee may meet by teleconference, 
videoconference, or electronic communications.
Ongoing Communication
After initial notification of the potential PHEICs by 
the United States and Mexico, WHO continued to main-
tain constant contact with the National IHR Focal Points. 
PAHO  coordinated  communication  between  the  United 
States, Mexico, and Canada to better understand the emerg-
ing events (14,21).
National IHR Focal Points around the world continue 
to supply daily reporting of confirmed and suspected cases 
to WHO (22,23). WHO communicated with all member 
states through the National IHR Focal Points and the WHO 
public website to inform them of recommendations for ac-
tions to mitigate the consequences of the epidemic (24). 
On April 28, PAHO hosted a teleconference with health 
officials and ministers from 26 countries to exchange infor-
mation on the influenza A (H1N1) epidemic (25).
The continued communication between the WHO and 
Member States, as well as between Mexico, Canada, and 
the United States, followed the regulations and provisions 
in the IHR (2005) and the SPP NAPAPI:
•   IHR (2005) Article 6 (Notification). Following the 
initial notification, the State Party and WHO shall 
continue to communicate in a timely fashion about 
the notified event, including sharing updated detailed 
public health information on the notified event. This 
information  includes  case  definitions,  laboratory 
results, source and type of risk, and number of cases 
and deaths.
•   IHR (2005) Article 11 (Provision of Information by 
WHO). WHO, in the most timely fashion possible, 
shall send information to all States Parties that enable 
the States to respond to the public health risk.
•   IHR (2005). As part of IHR (2005), WHO developed 
a  secure  Event  Information  website  to  share 
timely information about public health events and 
emergencies among State Parties and WHO. This 
password-protected  site  is  accessible  to  National 
IHR Focal Points.
•   SPP NAPAPI. Chapter 2: Emergency Coordination 
and  Communications.  Mexico,  Canada,  and  the 
United States agreed to share accurate and timely 
information before and during an outbreak. The 3 
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countries committed to working together so that all 3 
nations use the same information to inform decision 
making and action.
Coordinated Response
On April 25, a team of experts from PAHO arrived in 
Mexico to assist with the outbreak. The team comprised 
WHO  experts  from  Geneva  and  Washington,  DC,  and 
experts from the US Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention. The team supported the efforts of Mexico in the 
epidemiologic investigation, laboratory diagnosis, clinical 
management, communication, and outbreak management, 
and reported daily to WHO and PAHO (14,26).
WHO and PAHO arranged to have 489,000 treatments 
(treatment for an adult was 75-mg capsules, twice a day for 
15 days) of oseltamivir shipped to Mexico and other coun-
tries in the Americas. Approximately 220,000 treatments of 
oseltamivir were shipped to 21 countries in the Americas 
from the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot in 
Panama (27,28).
The Director-General of WHO, after receiving advice 
from the Emergency Committee, made temporary recom-
mendations to support the mitigation of the epidemic. WHO 
did not recommend travel or trade restrictions related to the 
virus but did recommend that persons who were ill delay 
international travel and that persons in whom symptoms 
developed after international travel seek medical attention 
(18,29).
The United States and other countries with confirmed 
cases shared isolates and sequences of the influenza A virus 
(H1N1) with the international community in a timely fash-
ion. Samples of the virus were shared for the purpose of risk 
assessment, analysis, and for making seed vaccine (30,31).
The role and responsibilities of WHO for coordinat-
ing and assisting in the global response to a public health 
emergency are outlined in the following provisions of the 
IHR (2005):
•   IHR  (2005)  Article  15  (Temporary  Recommend-
ations). If a PHEIC has been declared, the Director-
General  shall  issue  temporary  recommendations 
according  to  the  procedure  set  out  in  Article  49 
(Procedures for the Emergency Committee).
•   IHR (2005) Article 13 (Public Health Response). At 
the request of a State Party, WHO will assist in the 
response to a public health emergency by providing 
technical  guidance,  assessing  the  effectiveness  of 
control  measures,  and  mobilizing  international 
teams of experts to send to the affected area.
Pandemic Phases
At the initial meeting of the Emergency Committee 
on April 25, members decided to maintain the current 
WHO-designated pandemic phase at a level 3 (no sus-
tained human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain 
community-level  outbreaks)  (13,19).  The  Emergency 
Committee met again on April 27, and on the basis of 
the developing epidemic, recommended changing from 
pandemic phase 3 to pandemic phase 4 (human-to-human 
transmission is verified). Following this recommendation, 
the Director-General upgraded the classification to pan-
demic phase 4 (20).
The epidemic continued to expand globally, and the 
Emergency Committee met again and determined that the 
pandemic classification should be changed from phase 4 
to phase 5 (the same identified virus is causing sustained 
community-level outbreaks in multiple countries). The Di-
rector-General announced on April 29 that the world was at 
phase 5 on the WHO pandemic scale (32).
The meetings of the Emergency Committee followed 
the protocol of the IHR (2005) discussed above. As part of 
their recommendations for action, the committee cited the 
following excerpt from the WHO preparedness document:
•   WHO  Pandemic  Influenza  Preparedness  and 
Response  Section  3.2.2  (The  Designation  of  the 
Global Pandemic Phase). Per the pandemic plan of 
WHO, the Director-General designated the global 
pandemic  phase,  consistent  with  the  applicable 
provisions of the IHR (2005) and in consultation with 
affected Member States. Phase 4 signals sustained 
human-to-human transmission of the virus. Phase 5 
indicates the virus is causing sustained outbreaks in 
>2 countries. Phase 5 suggests that a pandemic is 
imminent, although not a forgone conclusion.
Actions Outside the Regulations
Although the global community generally adhered to 
the IHR (2005), supported WHO recommendations, and 
participated in unprecedented levels of information shar-
ing, there are still areas in which nations may be with-
holding information or make unilateral decisions that do 
not support the language or spirit of the revised IHR. For 
example, certain countries recommended against travel to 
North America, although WHO did not issue such recom-
mendations. Other nations interrupted trade of pork prod-
ucts from the United States, disregarding the determination 
by WHO and global scientists that cooked pork does not 
transmit the virus. In addition, some countries quarantined 
North American citizens, regardless of potential exposure 
to influenza A virus (H1N1). One of these countries defend-
ed its decision to quarantine persons from North America 
by citing what it believed is the failure of the United States 
and Mexico to implement entry and exit screening to de-
tect cases of infection with influenza virus (H1N1) (33). 
However, the US government referred to WHO advisory 
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and IHR Emergency Committee recommendations, which 
to date are not advising entry and exit screenings because 
WHO believes it would not help to reduce the spread of the 
disease (29,34).
In the past few weeks, WHO received reports of in-
fection with influenza virus (H1N1) from many nations 
outside North America, several of which involved sizable 
numbers of cases. However, these countries claimed that 
their cases were linked to importation, with no sustained 
human-to-human transmission within their borders. Recent 
evidence in some nations of substantial increases in case 
counts  makes  sustained  human-to-human  transmission 
almost a certainty (which may lead WHO to raising the 
pandemic level to 6, per the WHO definition of pandemic 
phases). Further examination will be required to determine 
if nations were hesitant to admit such transmission or if 
previous cases were caused by importation (35).
Discussion
The rapid succession of events in this timeline describ-
ing the first weeks of international communication and col-
laboration around the outbreak of a novel influenza A virus 
(H1N1) demonstrate the value of good planning and agree-
ments for addressing public health emergencies. Creating 
solid structures and procedures for dealing with emergen-
cies has been shown to be essential for an appropriate re-
sponse and mitigation effort. Although it is impossible to 
predict the exact nature of an emergency, thoughtful plan-
ning enables all affected parties to know their responsibili-
ties and to know with whom they need to work. Time is 
not wasted on developing procedures and contacts during 
an emergency. Instead, responders can focus on mitigating 
the consequences of the event. Planning does not guarantee 
that everything will run smoothly, or that all nations will 
adhere to agreed-upon regulations. However, the current 
situation suggests that mitigation outcomes and response 
efforts will be more successful than an outcome if plans 
and agreements did not exist.
Many of the provisions included in IHR (2005) came 
about as a result of WHO and global experience during the 
2003 SARS epidemic. Comparing the experience of SARS 
with the current influenza (H1N1) event can serve as a 
means of measuring the usefulness of the regulations. An 
obvious comparison is the global communication mecha-
nisms around an emerging epidemic. When WHO needed 
to reach the global community to alert it to the emergence 
of SARS, it needed to hold a press conference on a Satur-
day morning. No mechanism was in place for communicat-
ing with member states in a timely fashion. The creation 
of National IHR Focal Points enabled rapid communica-
tion between WHO and the entire global community, and 
guaranteed that proper authorities were notified and that in-
formation was shared with appropriate policy makers and 
responders. If only for this reason, the IHR (2005) can be 
deemed a success.
In this public health emergency, the revised IHR were 
used  accurately  and  appropriately.  The  regulations  were 
established in part to facilitate communication and formu-
late action in the identification of a PHEIC, and that is what 
happened. The SPP agreement was put into place to ensure 
regional cooperation in the event of a health emergency. 
Mexico, Canada, and the United States followed the SPP 
agreement  and  shared  timely  information.  These  events 
should serve as a call to action for each nation to do its best 
to fully implement IHR (2005) and engage in regional coop-
eration concerning disease surveillance and data sharing.
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